Ladies and Gentlemen,
LTC Bob Weimann (retired) U.S. Marine Corps recently researched our case on his own initiative. If you would be so inclined to send this letter out to your representatives to help us shed further light on our case, please do so. Any questions, please contact me. (Click on “CONTACT US” on header of page. LTC Weimann’s websites urls are posted at the bottom of this page.
Thank you sir, for your time, effort and interest in our situation. ~Mrs. Hatley
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Attachment 1: Confinement Actually Served in Cases of Multiple Killings *
| IncidentNumber | Year | Name | Deaths | CourtMartialSentence | ConveningAuthorityAction | Post-ReviewSentence | Actual Time Served | ActualTimeServed
(days) |
DaysPerVictim |
| 1 | 1956 | SSgt McKeon | 6 | 9 months | Approved | 3 months | 12 days | 12 | 2 |
| 2 | 1966 | PFC Potter | 5 | Life | Approved | Approved | 12 years 1 month | 4410 | 882 |
| Sgt Vogel | 5 | 50 years | Approved | 8 years | 9 years 15 days | 3300 | 660 | ||
| PFC Boyd | 5 | 4 years | Approved | Approved | 3 years 15 days | 1110 | 222 | ||
| 3 | 1966 | PFC Keenan | 2 | Life | 25 years | 2 years 9 months | 2 years 15 days | 745 | 372 |
| Cpl Luczko | 2 | 3 years | Approved | Approved | 2 years | 730 | 365 | ||
| 4 | 1968 | LCpl Allen | 5 | Life | 20 years | 7 years | 2 years 11 months | 1065 | 213 |
| LCpl Belknap | 3 | 2 years | Approved | Approved | 1 year 3 months | 455 | 152 | ||
| LCpl Maushart | 2 | 2 years | Approved | Approved | 1 year 4 months | 486 | 243 | ||
| 5 | 1968 | LT Calley (USA) | 22 | Life | 20 years | 10 years | 3 years 4.5 months ** | 1230 | 56 |
| 6 | 1969 | Cpl Reese | 4 | Life | Approved | 3 years | 2 years 4 months | 850 | 212 |
| LCpl Crider | 4 | Life | Approved | 3 years | 3 years 9 months | 1368 | 342 | ||
| 7*** | 1970 | Pvt Schwarz | 16 | Life | 1 year | Approved | 9 months 15 days | 289 | 18 |
| PFC Green | 16 | 5 years | 1 year | Approved | 8 months 15 days | 256 | 16 |
Notes:
* Includes all known USMC Vietnam-era multiple non-combatant victim cases.
** Three years of Lt Calley’s confinement was served in his BOQ apartment.
*** The “Son Thang Case”: one accused received immunity in return for his testimony; two, including the ringleader, were found not guilty, a significant factor in the final Schwarz/Green sentences. [1]
Open Letter to the Senator James Webb, Subcommittee Chairman, Senate Armed Services Personnel Committee
Dear Senator,
I was cleaning out my desk and files the other day and I came across the USMC High Profile Court-Martial Lessons Learned Pamphlet that contains the above matrix. The matrix lists a series of Marine Corps high profile court martial results starting with the famous Ribbon Creek incident and ending with the Vietnam Son Thang Incident that occurred in 1970.
I should point out two notable exceptions in this matrix. First, the Ribbon Creek Court Martial is a training incident (vs combat) occurring on the Parris Island Recruit Training Base. In 1956, SSgt McKeon is a drill instructor charged with the deaths of six recruits after he led his recruit platoon on a “night training” hike into the swamps surrounding Parris Island. As he marched his platoon through the swamp, the platoon hit deep water and it is believed that the some of the non-swimmers panicked resulting in six deaths. All other court-martials listed are related to combat incidents and involve the death of non-combatants.
The second exception is that all the listed court-martials involve Marines except for the LT Calley case that, as noted, is a US Army Court-martial. The assumption here is that the Lt Calley Court Martial (My Lai, Vietnam) is about as high profile as you can get and therefore sets a standard. The author also states that these two exceptions are commonly used defense strategy examples that present the accused as ether an underdog (Ribbon Creek) or as a scapegoat (My Lai).[2]
What immediately gets my attention and should also get yours is the sentence and time served columns, especially when compared to the sentences of USA 1stSgt John Hatley, Sgt Michael Leahy and SFC Joseph Mayo. All three were convicted of killing four Iraqi men. Their uncompleted “matrix” is below. I say uncompleted because these soldier’s cases are approaching their “post review sentence” phase:
| IncidentNumber | Year | Name | Deaths | CourtMartialSentence | ConveningAuthorityAction | Post-ReviewSentence | Actual Time Served | ActualTimeServed
(days) |
DaysPerVictim |
| 8 | 2007 | 1stSgt Hatley | 4 | Life | 40 years | ||||
| Sgt Leahy | 4 | Life | 20 years | ||||||
| SFC Mayo | 4 | 35 years | 20 years |
Of the seven “Life” sentences listed in the first matrix only one is approved by the “Post Review Sentence” Authority. All, except one, are substantially reduced by either the Convening Authority or the Post Review Board. The Lt Calley Case, with the highest numbers of deaths of 22, is reduced to only 10 years with Lt Calley serving less than 4 years in his BOQ Room. The BOQ is a far cry from the cells of Leavenworth where Hatley, Leahy and Mayo are presently confined.
I feel there are a number of issues here that justify the substantial reduction of punishments or pardon for these three soldiers. One of the anomalies that the Hatley, Leahy and Mayo matrix adds is that the four males they killed were clearly combatants. The four Iraqi males obviously are not women or children, as are the cases listed in the matrix (except for SSgt McKeon). If a person is dressed as a civilian and picks up a weapon on a battlefield, he is a combatant in accordance with the Laws of War. This group of Army NCOs caught these four males not only with assault rifles and explosives but also with two sniper rifles. As you know Senator, two sniper rifles plus four combatants usually equals two sniper teams.
From a legal view, one of the elements of proof for murder is that you must present a body. No Iraqi bodies or forensic evidence was ever presented to the court-martial board. The murder changes would never hold up in a civilian court and frankly, they should not hold up in a court-martial.
Then there is the matter of extenuating circumstances. In Iraq, the US military command never had an effective detainee policy or apparatus that adequately protected our service men and woman. The effectiveness of the Iraq detainee policy is broadcast in the name given to it by the troops as the “catch and release” program. “We catch’em, then they release them; so we can catch’em again and they release ‘em again.” When I review these Soldiers case, I become convince that their intent was not murder but actually an effort to save the lives of their fellow Soldiers.
This was an extended deployment of 14 months. The company was taking casualties (KIAs) from snipers. With no effective way to neutralize these four Iraqi males caught with two sniper rifles (and other weapons and explosives), these Soldiers were forced into the self defense mode. By capturing these Iraqi snipers, they had effectively identified themselves as the sniper’s next targets. Insurgent snipers protect themselves with secrecy. Upon their capture that secrecy no longer existed. In addition, these snipers, because of their capture, were now face-to-face with the leaders (NCOs) of the company. As you know senator, leaders that are always a priority target for snipers. If something did not change, the best these soldiers were going to do was spend the remainder of their deployment feeling a set of cross hairs on the back of their necks. The worst scenario would be these Soldiers reported to their families as KIAs.
Now the issue that really knots my gut is the fact that all DOD orders, and all service orders, state:
“All reportable incidents committed by or against U.S. personnel, enemy persons, or any other individual are reported promptly, investigated thoroughly, and, where appropriate, remedied by corrective action.”[3]
Based on the DOD Law of Warfare Program, the question then becomes where are the war crime investigations and “remedied corrective actions” on enemy war crimes committed against our Soldiers and Marines?
On January 20, 2007, a group of heavily armed Iraqi males conducted what has now called the Karbala Raid. Posing as an American security team, dressed in US Army fatigues, carrying American weapons and speaking English, this group passed through Iraqi security and made straight for the American compound. They immediately killed one American, wounded three and took four prisoners.
The four captured Americans were found a short time later; “three of the soldiers were dead and one was dying when they were found 25 miles away from the compound”[4]. Two of the four were still handcuffed.
On March 22, 2007, the US Military announced the capture of Qais Khazali, a Madhi Army leader, who is believed to be involved in the planning and execution of the Karbala Raid. In August 2009, General Ray Odierno releases Qais Khazali to the Iraqi government.[5] On January 3, 2010, Qais Khazali was released by the Iraqi government without trial giving him freedom and in effect an unofficial pardon.[6]
The five soldiers executed by Qais Khazali are:
Capt. Brian S. Freeman, 31, of Temecula, Calif
1st Lt. Jacob N. Fritz, 25, of Verdon, Neb.
Spc. Johnathan B. Chism, 22, of Gonzales, La.
Pfc. Shawn P. Falter, 25, of Cortland, N.Y.
Pvt. Johnathon M. Millican, 20, of Trafford, Ala.[7]
The question that screams at me is why wasn’t Qais Khazali ever put on trial for the murder of these five soldiers?
In my mind, you have a situation or system that attempts to counter the truth that our combat warriors learn on the battle field with a falsehood. The Soldiers know these four Iraqi males are combatants. They know that from the weapons they took from their enemy’s hands and from the casualties their unit has taken. The US military detainee system then tells them; No, they are not combatants, these are outstanding Iraqi citizens, turn them loose. Falsehoods always scream out when faced with common sense and logic and they were screaming at these three soldiers.
In addition, even if the system works to the point that these four Iraqi war criminals were detained, it will collapse again when the US military leadership not only fails to pursue the war crimes committed against our own service men and women but also when it freely releases war criminals, as in the Qais Khazali case. Is it no wonder that these three Soldiers fell back onto the basic right of self defense granted to all Soldiers and Marines in battle. Battle field self defense is: I have the right to kill the enemy before he kills me.
Senator, two of these soldier’s (1stSgt John Hatley and SFC Joseph Mayo) are approaching their “post review sentence” phase (set for 1 April 2010). I understand that Sgt Michael Leahy’s board is complete and he received no reduction to his sentence. As the Senate Subcommittee Chairman that has “jurisdiction over all matters relating to active and reserve military personnel, including pay rates, military health care, education benefits … and military justice”[8], I am urging you to look into this matter. Someone needs to answer the questions I pose about the detainee and Law of Warfare Program systemic failures. The post review sentence board needs to hear those questions and take the answers into consideration. Your purpose should be the reduction these soldier’s sentences to what is reasonable and fair based on their need and right to defend themselves on the battle field.
Bob Weimann
LtCol, USMC Ret.
http://warchronicle.com/DefendOurTroops/Home.htm
[1] The High Profile Court-Martial: Lessons Learned from Ribbon Creek to Vietnam; Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 22 May 2007, p. 11
[2] The High Profile Court-Martial: Lessons Learned from Ribbon Creek to Vietnam; Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned, 22 May 2007, p. 2
[3] DODD 5100.77, DOD Law of War Program dated May 9, 2006, p. 2 (emphasis added)
[4] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16826151/
[5] http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/world/middleeast/18iraq.html?_r=2&ref=world
[6] http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/iraq/2010708621_iraq06.html
[7] http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16826151/
[8] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_Senate_Armed_Services_Subcommittee_on_Personnel
